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The proliferation of free 
trade agreements and customs 
unions since the early 1990s has 
been remarkable. Today most 
countries are party to one or 
more regional trade initiatives 
(World Bank 2004). Economic 
integration at the regional level 
allows the members to reap 
benefits from specialization 
while accommodating the 
particular needs and adjustment 
capacities of the countries 
involved.  Structural and fiscal 
adjustments cannot be avoided 
entirely, however, and in some 
cases special provisions to 
contain adverse impacts on 
countries and foster coherence 
among members have been 
devised.  One type of provision 
compensates for losses of 
government revenue from 
intraregional tariff reductions.  
 
Multilateral or regional trade 
liberalization does not 
necessarily lead to revenue 
losses  
If tariff reductions (to 
levels above zero) trigger a 
more-than-proportional increase 
in trade flows, government 
revenues from trade taxes may 
in fact rise.  Moreover, revenues 
from taxes on value-added 
(sales) and income taxes are 
likely to grow because of higher 
domestic consumption arising 
from lower prices of tradables, 
as well as higher growth 
resulting from the improved 
allocation of resources in the 
economy.  If revenue shortfalls occur, however, 
countries with sound 
administrative capacity will often be able 
to recover the losses by strengthening 
domestic indirect taxes, broadening the 
tax base, and increasing the efficiency of 
raising funds for the government (Keen 
and Lighart 2001). 
 
However, low-income countries, 
and particularly the least developed 
countries (LDCs), frequently lack 
adequate administrative capacity and a 
well functioning domestic tax system.  
They tend to rely heavily on trade taxes as 
sources of government revenue.  
Lowering or eliminating tariffs on trade 
with regional partners, therefore, can 
constitute a significant risk to a country’s 
fiscal position (Baunsgaard and Keen 
2005).  For example, estimates of the 
prospective impact of the Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the 
European Union and the Economic 
Community of West African states 
(ECOWAS) indicate that some of the 
participating African countries could lose 
more than 20 percent of their government 
revenues as a result of preferential tariff 
reductions (Busse and Grossmann 2004). 
 
To alleviate such potentially 
important fiscal effects, revenue loss 
compensation arrangements (RLCAs) 
have been introduced into some regional 
integration initiatives (RIIs).  Most 
RLCAs involve the establishment of a 
compensation fund from which payouts 
for tariff revenue losses are made.  
Several examples can be found in RIIs in 
Africa (table 1).  However, lack of 
progress in the underlying schemes has 
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often hampered implementation.  For example in 
ECOWAS, some members have yet to implement 
their trade liberalization commitments or pay their 
contributions to the compensation fund.  The 
RLCAs in the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic 
Community of Central African states (ECCAS) 
appear even further away from effective 
implementation.  By contrast, the revenue sharing 
funds in the southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) have been 
operational for several years. 
 
 
RLCAs differ in their design and 
implementation characteristics, particularly with 
respect to their duration and their handling or 
resource mobilization and payout criteria.  We will 
discuss each of these features and describe an 
operational RLCA, SACU’s revised Common 
Revenue Pool in Box 1 (page 5). 
 
Many ways to mobilize resources…  
 
There are many ways to raise resources to 
compensate for revenue losses. The resource 
mobilization schemes in existing RLCAs can be 
classified according to whether they rely on 
existing or new revenue sources, and again 
according to whether they are based on domestic 
or trade taxes. 
• Existing (or new) domestic and trade taxes.  
Contributions are paid from general 
government revenues.  A (non-operational) 
example is ECCAS, where the contributions of 
members to the compensation fund are 
determined according to the saved tariff 
expenditures on intraregional exports. 
• Existing trade taxes.  Customs duty revenues 
are allocated to a compensation or revenue 
sharing fund.  An example is the customs 
component in SACU’s Common revenue 
Pool. 
• New Trade taxes.  Tariffs on imports are 
increased to raise revenues for use as 
compensation.  For example, ECOWAS and 
WAEMU apply surcharges to third country 
imports, while the Caribbean community and 
common Market (CARICOM) allows its less 
developed members to apply for the temporary 
(re)introduction of intra-RII tariffs in order to 
overcome tariff revenue shortfalls. 
 
All Existing RLCAs are based at least 
partly on trade taxes, and many on newly 
introduced ones.  Import duties have the advantage 
of being relatively easy to administer.  They 
represent, however, one of the most economically 
costly forms of taxation (Clarete and Whalley 
1987).  Moreover, in order to minimize distortions 
in the economy, it is generally desirable to first try 
to enhance revenue collection by broadening the 
tax base, e.g. by curtailing tax or import duty 
exemptions, before increasing tax rates. 
 
Designated taxes are used in all existing 
RLCAs, except ECCAS, as the instruments to 
raise funds for compensation.  This earmarking of 
revenue sources protects the compensation fund 
largely from annual budget discussions in member 
countries.  On the other hand, it tends to expose 
the fund to volatility in the underlying revenue 
source, to which other funding arrangements, such 
as those based on the relative economic size of 
partner countries, would not be subject. 
 
… and to determine the payout to beneficiary 
countries 
 
RLCAs also differ in how payments from 
compensation funds are allocated.  The criteria 
used in existing RLCAs to determine the pay out 
to beneficiary countries are based on intraregional 
trade shares or incurred revenue losses. 
• Trade Shares.  The funds available for 
compensation or revenue sharing are 
distributed among member countries in 
proportion to their shares in total intraregional 
imports.  SACUs customs component payout 
is an example of a trade share-based 
compensation scheme. 
• Incurred revenue loss.  Compensation is paid 
on the basis of submitted customs declarations 
on intra-RII trade for the period under 
consideration and the loss in revenue 
associated with the non-application of most-
favored-nation (MFN) tariffs to partner 
country trade.  Such a scheme is operated, for 
example, by WAEMU (and envisaged by 
ECCAS and ECOWAS).  The compensation 
payments are determined by multiplying MFN 
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tariff rates by intraregional trade flows after 
removal of intra-RII tariffs.  This method 
overestimates the loss of tariff revenue, as the 
liberalization of intraregional trade will trigger 
an increase in the exchange of goods among 
partner countries.  A scheme based on 
historical intraregional trade flows (that is, 
flows before establishment of the RII) would 
avoid this estimation bias, but it would not 
take into account changes in intraregional 
trade flows that might occur for reasons other 
than regional integration. 
 
 
  The administration and monitoring of a 
payout scheme becomes more demanding 
depending on the degree of precision the partner 
countries require in the calculating and tracking 
the tariff revenue losses.  Schemes based on 
historical trade patterns or aggregate intraregional 
trade shares are much less cumbersome to handle 
than those centered on shipment-specific customs 
declarations, for example.  Although customs 
operations in many countries are intensifying their 
use of computers and, hence, becoming more 
capable of treating large amounts of data quickly 
and reliably, considerable scope for error in 
handling RLCA-relevant information remains.  
 
  The establishment of RLCAs has often 
been propelled by concerns that benefits from 
regional integration might be unequally distributed 
and accentuate disparities in development levels 
within the region, with the stronger, larger 
economies gaining at the expense of weaker, 
smaller countries.  In addition to being instruments 
of compensation for lost tariff revenues, therefore, 
RLCAs may be seen as vehicles of economic 
solidarity weighted in favor of the poorer countries 
in the group.  For that reason many compensation 
funds also have a role in supporting development 
and cohesion.  For example, the development 
component of SACU’s Common Revenue Pool is 
distributed among member countries in inverse 
proportion to their per capita income, thus 
favoring less-developed members. 
 
Many arrangements are of a temporary nature 
 
  As intraregional liberalization leads to 
expanded trade, revenues from domestic value-
added, excise, and income taxes can be expected 
to increase, reducing the necessity for revenue 
redistribution over time.  Many RLCAs, though 
not all, are therefore of a temporary nature. 
• Fixed duration.  The period of operation for 
the RLCA may be limited to a certain number 
of years.  For example, for ECOWAS the 
duration of the arrangement is four years; for 
WAEMU, six years. 
• Duration determined by administrative 
decision.  The period of operation of the 
RLCA may be decided case by case.  Such an 
arrangement exists in CARICOM, where the 
Council for Trade and Economic Development 
accepts applications for the revenue safeguard 
fund from less-developed members, 
• Duration not determined.  The duration of the 
RLCA may be open-ended.  Such an 
arrangement exists in SACU. 
 
  The compensation payments in ECOWAS 
and WAEMU are scheduled to be scaled down 
over time before the RLCA expires.  A similar 
development might occur in SACU, as further 
bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization reduces 
customs revenues and hence the funds available to 
compensate for revenue losses.  The scaling down 
of RLCA payouts over time gives countries an 
incentive to pursue their fiscal reform processes 
and strengthen non-trade sources of government. 
 
Provisions on revenue sharing can be added to 
compensate for revenue loss 
For countries that have weak domestic tax 
administrations and rely heavily on trade taxes for 
government finances, lowering or eliminating 
tariffs on trade with regional partners can pose a 
significant fiscal risk.  To pursue regional 
integration despite that risk, provisions on revenue 
sharing have been added to several RIIs, although 
not all are operational.  Analysis of existing 
arrangements suggests several desirable design 
features for RLCAs - among them the use of 
domestic tax revenues instead of economically 
more costly trade taxes as the preferred means of 
raising revenues for compensation.  Moreover, 
simple payout criteria, possibly historically based, 
facilitate the monitoring and administration of the 
mechanism.  And finally, limited periods of 
duration and a reduction of compensation 
payments over time are consistent with the 
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revenue-enhancing effect of trade-induced growth 
and preserve the incentive for governments to 
pursue fiscal reforms 
 
 
References 
 
 As our survey of RLCAs showed, there 
are very few examples of operational 
arrangements; even these are generally of a 
temporary nature.  This means that most regional 
trade agreements do not foresee or implement 
provisions for revenue sharing or revenue loss 
compensation.  Hence, countries that are 
confronted with markedly adverse impacts on their 
fiscal balance as a result of preferential 
liberalization can not rely on designated resources 
from regional partners but must cope with the 
revenue shortfalls domestically through 
complementary policy reforms.  In some cases, 
improvements in customs collection through better 
compliance with existing regulations may be 
sufficient to offset the revenue losses.  In others, 
more comprehensive reform measures to broaden 
the tax base and shift revenue generation away 
from trade taxes will be required.  Such fiscal 
reforms are not easy to design and implement, but 
they are often necessary to complement trade 
reforms and reap the full benefits of economic 
integration. 
Baunsgaard, T., and M. Keen, 2005. Tax Revenue 
and (or?) Trade Liberalization. Working 
Paper WP/05/112. International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 
Busse, M., and H. Grossmann. 2004. Assessing the 
Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement on West African Countries. 
HWWA Discussion Paper 294. 
Hamburgisches Welt Wirtschafts-Archiv, 
Hamburg. 
Clarete, R., and J. Whalley. 1987. “Comparing the 
Marginal Welfare Costs of Commodity and 
Trade Taxes.” Journal of Public Economics 
33: 357–62. 
Keen, M., and J. Ligthart. 2001. “Coordinating 
Tariff Reductions and Domestic Tax 
Reform.” Journal of International Economics 
56: 407–25. 
Kirk, R., and M. Stern. 2003. The New Southern 
African Customs Union Agreement. Africa 
Region Working Paper Series 57. World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
World Bank. 2004. Global Economic Prospects 
2005: Trade, Regionalism, and Development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 4
 
TRADE NOTE September 15, 2006 
 
5 
  
 
 
Box 1: The example of SACU’s Common Revenue Pool 
   
In October 2002, the members of SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) 
signed a new agreement that revised the union’s revenue sharing arrangements, the purpose of which is to 
increase members’ fiscal stability.  The arrangement stipulates that all customs, excise, and additional 
duties collected in the common customs area are to be paid into a Common Revenue Pool.  The pooled 
revenues are then categorized into components for distribution purposes.  SACU members agreed that 
their respective shares during any financial year would be calculated from each of three distinct 
components, net of the budgeted costs of financing the administration of the arrangement. 
 
• The customs component, consisting of all customs duties actually collected, is distributed on the basis 
of each country’s percentage share of total intra-SACU imports, excluding re-exports.  As South 
Africa currently has a large trade surplus with its SACU partner countries, its share in total intra-
SACU imports is relatively small, and its payout from the customs component is less than 
proportional to the country’s relative economic size.  Conversely, the four less-developed SACU 
members receive a share of total customs revenues that exceeds their relative size. 
• The excise component, consisting of all excise duties actually collected on goods produced in the 
common customs area (net of the development component), is allocated on the basis of each 
country’s share in total SACU gross domestic product (GDP).  The inclusion of excise duties in the 
common pool was motivated by the difficulty of administering separate excise regimes in a region 
with porous borders.  Payouts from the excise component currently do not have a market 
redistributional effect. 
• The development component is funded initially from 15 percent of the total excise component and 
distributed on the basis of each country’s GDP per capita, with lower income countries receiving a 
larger than proportional share of the payouts. 
 
 The revenue shares of each component was supposed to be calculated from audited data on trade, 
GDP, and GDP per capita, as well as agreed customs and excise forecasts, with possible adjustments in 
the ensuing two years to reflect actual collections (Kirk and Stern 2003).  The distribution of revenues is 
approximate and implicit, thereby avoiding a cumbersome handling of customs declarations in the 
compensation process.  The flexible and symmetric setup also facilitates the possible expansion of 
customs union membership to other countries in the region.  However, in practice the revenue sharing 
formula has provided countries with incentives to overstate their intra-SACU imports in order to obtain 
larger payouts, so that it has been very difficult – if not impossible – to reach agreement on the base for 
revenue distribution. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of Revenue Loss Compensation Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements (December 2004) 
Agreement Stage of 
integration 
No. of members 
(of which LDCs) 
Financing 
mechanism 
Allocation  
criteria 
Period of 
operation 
Remarks 
Caribbean 
Community 
(CARICOM) 
Common Market 14 (0) Imposition of intra-
regional tariffs. 
Retaining of revenues 
from intra-regional 
tariffs. 
Temporary, 
according to 
decision by Council 
for Trade and Econ. 
Development. 
On application by 
less developed 
members to Council 
for Trade and Econ. 
Development. 
Common Market 
for Eastern and 
Southern  
Africa 
(COMESA) 
Preferential/Free 
Trade Agreement 
20 (13) To be determined in 
Protocol. 
To be determined in 
Protocol. 
 RLCM-Protocol in 
the process of 
finalization. 
Economic 
Community of 
Central African 
States  
(ECCAS) 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
11 (8) Saved tariff 
expenditure on 
intra-regional 
exports. 
Lost tariff revenue on 
intra-regional imports. 
 RLCM not 
implemented. 
Economic 
Community of 
West African 
States  
(ECOWAS) 
Preferential Trade 
Agreement 
15 (11) Community Levy of 
0.5% on imports 
from third countries. 
Lost tariff revenue 
from intra-regional 
imports, according to 
customs declaration. 
Four years (from 
Jan. 2002), 
degressive 
compensation. 
RLCM not 
operational. 
Southern African 
Customs Union 
(SACU) 
Customs Union 5 (1) Common Revenue 
Pool of all customs 
and excise duties. 
Combination of 
projected intra-
regional import shares 
and gross domestic 
product. 
Not determined. Parts of funds raised 
are used for other 
purposes than 
revenue loss 
compensation. 
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
8 (7) Community 
Solidarity Surcharge 
of 1% on imports 
from third countries. 
Lost tariff revenue 
from intra-regional 
imports, according to 
customs declaration.  
Six years (from Jan 
2000), degressive 
compensation. 
Parts of funds raised 
are used for other 
purposes than 
revenue loss 
compensation. 
Source:  Author. 
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